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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that pri-
vate property may not “be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.”
1
  This clause compels the government to compensate a prop-
erty owner for losses caused by government regulation (often termed 
“regulatory takings”).
2
  For example, the clause is triggered when a 
government regulation causes a permanent physical invasion of 
property
3
 or eliminates all economically beneficial uses of such prop-
erty.
4
 
But what if the government regulates property in a way that 
merely reduces, rather than eliminates, the property’s economic val-
ue?  Between 1978 and 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States 
twice addressed this “partial regulatory takings”
5
 issue and took a dif-
ferent approach in each case.  In 1978, the Court wrote in Penn Cen-
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law.  I would like to thank Blake 
Johnston, my former research assistant, for his valuable help; I would also like to 
thank Peter Appel and Jerry Anderson for their valuable comments.  Any errors of 
fact, law, or logic are mine alone. 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (using term “regulato-
ry takings”); DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 320 (5th ed. 2008) (“[R]egulatory takings doctrine . . . [is] 
the idea that a police power regulation can, if excessive, be declared by a court to be 
a Fifth Amendment taking.”).  
 3 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).  
 4 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).  Note, however, 
that the government may make property economically useless pursuant to “restric-
tions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already 
place upon land ownership.”  Id. at 1029.  
 5 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
326 (2002) (using the term “partial regulatory takings”).  Of course, this term is 
somewhat misleading, because if the courts hold that a regulation is not sufficiently 
intrusive to require compensation of affected landowners, the regulation is technical-
ly not a “taking” at all.  Nevertheless, I use the term in deference to the Supreme 
Court’s shorthand.  
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tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York that courts must consider (1) 
the economic impact of a regulation upon a property owner, (2) the 
effect of such regulation upon the property owner’s reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations, and (3) the “character of the govern-
mental action.”
6
  But two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the 
Court seemingly abandoned this three-pronged approach and ruled 
that non-confiscatory zoning creates a taking “if the ordinance does 
not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”
7
 
Until 2005, lower courts often resolved this apparent conflict by 
balancing the public interest favoring government regulation against 
the losses a takings plaintiff incurred because of the regulation.
8
  
Courts following this “private harm/public interest” balancing test 
held that the  “character of the government action” element of Penn 
Central required an “inquiry into an assessment of the ‘purpose and 
importance of the public interest,’ which then must be weighed 
against the [property owner’s] loss.”
9
  But the Supreme Court’s 2005 
decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
10
 called this “private 
harm/public interest” balancing test into question.  In Lingle, the Su-
preme Court overruled Agins and rejected the application of the 
“substantially advance” test in regulatory takings cases.  The Court 
held that takings cases may not turn solely on whether government 
regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest because 
such a “formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, 
not a takings, test, and . . . has no proper place in our takings juri-
sprudence.”
11
 
Some commentators claim that by overruling Agins, Lingle also 
reinterpreted Penn Central as prohibiting lower courts from consider-
 
 6 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
 7 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).  
 8 See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 10.6, at 430 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the 
“‘character or extent of the government action’ factor has been read by many courts 
to open up the inquiry into an assessment of the ‘purpose and importance of the 
public interest’ which then must be weighed against the loss”).  The “loss” compo-
nent of this test includes both the “economic impact” and “investment-backed expec-
tations” factors of the Penn Central test.  See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.  
 9 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.6, at 430; see, e.g., Bass Enters. 
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (using such a standard); see 
also infra note 76 (citing examples).    
 10 544 U.S. 528 (2005).  
 11 Id. at 540. 
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ing the public benefits of regulation.
12
  For example, a land use horn-
book reasons that pre-Lingle precedent required an “injection of due 
process considerations into the takings equation” by considering the 
appropriate ends of government action.
13
  By resisting such an “injec-
tion,” Lingle “eliminates evaluation of the legitimacy of the regula-
tion, and a judicial balancing of interests should follow it to the dust-
bin of Supreme Court errors.”
14
  Some commentators argue that 
Lingle actually eliminated the “character of the government action” 
factor established in Penn Central,
15
 while others merely contend that 
the “character” factor no longer allows lower courts to weigh the pub-
lic interest favoring government regulation.
16
 
This Article disagrees with the assertion that lower courts cannot 
consider the public benefits of regulation and argues that, even after 
Lingle, courts can and should balance the harm land use regulation 
imposes on a takings plaintiff against the weight of the public interest 
supporting such regulation.  This is so for two reasons.  First, the Lin-
gle decision can be harmonized with a “private harm/public interest” 
balancing test.  Lingle holds that the existence of a valid public pur-
pose standing alone may not justify an otherwise problematic regula-
tion.  This rule is perfectly consistent with the proposition that courts 
may balance a public purpose against the harm to a takings plaintiff. 
Second, the “private harm/public interest” balancing test is eas-
ier to apply than alternative interpretations of the Penn Central “cha-
racter” factor.  Commentators who reject the balancing test assert 
that the “character” factor should be limited to analysis of whether a 
regulation resembles a physical invasion of property and/or the ex-
tent to which a takings plaintiff is singled out for regulation.
17
  This 
Article suggests that these interpretations are more difficult to apply 
than the “private harm/public interest” balancing test.
18
  To be sure, 
the Penn Central test gives judges little guidance regardless of how it is 
interpreted and should perhaps be overruled.
19
  But as long as Penn 
 
 12 See infra Part IV.  
 13 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.4, at 420. 
 14 See id. § 10.6, at 430.  
 15 See infra Part IV.A. 
 16 See infra Part IV.B. 
 17 See infra Part V.   
 18 Id. 
 19 Cf. Stephen M. Durden, Animal Farm Jurisprudence: Hiding Personal Predilections 
Behind the “Plain Language” of the Takings Clause, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 355, 372–74 
(2008) (noting the diversity of scholarly opinions as to the proper scope of the Tak-
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Central continues to be good law, balancing public interests and pri-
vate harms is less incomprehensible and more consistent with Su-
preme Court precedent than the most popular alternatives.  Accor-
dingly, courts should treat the public interest favoring regulation as 
part of the “character” factor. 
  Part II of this Article outlines the history of the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine.  Part III explains why, as a doctrinal matter, Lingle does 
not bar courts from weighing the public interest as part of the “cha-
racter” factor.  Part IV explains why, as a policy matter, courts should 
consider the public interest.  Finally, Part V shows how courts may in-
telligibly do so, using a recent case as an example. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW 
Before Penn Central, the Supreme Court rarely addressed regula-
tory takings issues, although its first major regulatory takings decision 
seemingly balanced the economic effects of government regulation 
against the public interest favoring it.
20
  In Penn Central, the Court 
likewise required courts to consider the economic harm caused by 
government regulation and the “character” of that regulation, with-
out making it clear what “character” meant.
21
  Some lower court deci-
sions (as well as some language in the Court’s own opinions), howev-
er, suggest that this factor refers to the weight of the public interest 
supporting government regulation, apparently requiring courts to 
balance the public interests favoring regulation against a property 
owner’s economic harm and investment-backed expectations.
22
  Most 
recently, the Court decided Lingle, which created confusion among 
lower courts and placed the law in flux.
23
 
A. In the Beginning . . . 
Until the early twentieth century, courts generally applied the 
Takings Clause exclusively to physical seizures of private property, as 
 
ings Clause; the most pro-regulation commentators argue that only physical appropr-
iation of property by the government is a “taking,” while some libertarian-minded 
commentators claim that all government regulations are “takings”); James W. Ely, Jr., 
“Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 
2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 45 (arguing that the Penn Central test’s “indeterminate 
factors provide little guidance to individuals”). 
 20 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); infra Part II.A.  
 21 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); infra notes 34–
42 and accompanying text.  
 22 See infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text.  
 23 See infra Part II.C.  
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opposed to regulations that merely limited the use of a person’s 
property.
24
  The first time the Supreme Court applied the Takings 
Clause to a regulatory taking was the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon.
25
  In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company challenged the 
constitutionality of a statute that restricted coal mining beneath pri-
vate residences in order to prevent subsidence (i.e., a cave-in) of the 
residence.
26
  The Court held that “while property may be regulated to 
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing.”
27
 
In applying the “too far” test, the Pennsylvania Coal Court ad-
dressed both the degree of harm to the coal company and the public 
interest justifying the regulation at issue.  As to the private harm fac-
tor, the Court wrote that although property 
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to 
the police power . . . [o]ne fact for consideration in determining 
such limits is the extent of the diminution.  When it reaches a cer-
tain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exer-
cise of eminent domain and compensation [is necessary] to sus-
tain the act.
28
 
The Court added that by making the coal company’s right to mine 
coal “commercially impracticable . . . [the statute] has very nearly the 
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying 
it.”
29
  In other words, the anti-subsidence statute went “too far” be-
cause it virtually destroyed the value of the coal company’s property 
interest. 
The Court proceeded to hold that the public interest justifying 
the statute was not “sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of 
the [coal company’s] constitutionally protected rights.”
30
  The Court 
offered two reasons for its conclusion.  First, the government sought 
to protect a single private house, which “in ordinary private affairs the 
public interest does not warrant much [government] interference.  A 
 
 24 See CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 320 (noting that Pennsylvania 
Coal “generally is viewed as the origin of the regulatory takings doctrine”).  
 25 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 320. 
 26 Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412–13.  The coal company owned the mineral rights 
to land beneath a house and sought to exercise those rights to dig out coal.  Id. at 
412.   
 27 Id. at 415 (emphasis added).  
 28 Id. at 413. 
 29 Id. at 414–15.  
 30 Id. at 414.  
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source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance. . . .  The 
damage is not common or public.”
31
  Second, the statute “is not justi-
fied as a protection of personal safety”
32
 because the coal company 
gave homeowners timely notice of its intent to mine under their 
homes, allowing the homeowners to avoid physical harm from subsi-
dence.
33
 
Thus, Pennsylvania Coal suggested that, in determining whether a 
taking goes “too far,” courts may consider the extent to which a gov-
ernment regulation harms a property owner and the extent to which 
it protects the public interest. 
B. Penn Central and Its Successors: The Three-Part Test 
The Supreme Court paid little attention to regulatory takings
34
 
until its 1978 decision in Penn Central.
35
  In that case, a landowner 
sought to build an office building above a railroad terminal.
36
  The 
city prohibited construction because the terminal was a historic 
landmark.
37
  The landowner then filed a takings action, asserting that 
the enforcement of the historic landmark ordinance unconstitution-
ally seized the “air rights” above its building.
38
 
The Court wrote that its regulatory takings decisions 
have identified several factors that have particular significance.  
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, par-
ticularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations.  So, too, is the character of the governmental ac-
tion.  A “taking” may more readily be found when the interfe-
rence with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government, than when interference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.
39
 
 
 31 Id. at 413.  
 32 Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.4, at 417 (describing Penn Cen-
tral as “[t]he next important regulatory takings decision”).  
 35 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 36 Id. at 116.  
 37 Id. at 117.  
 38 Id. at 119, 130.  
 39 Id. at 124 (citations omitted). 
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Thus, the Court seemingly required lower courts to consider (1) the 
economic impact of a regulation upon a property owner, (2) the reg-
ulation’s impact upon the property owner’s investment-backed ex-
pectations, and (3) the character of the government action. 
As to the first of these factors, the Court found that the city’s in-
terference with the landowner’s property rights was not particularly 
severe; the city did not interfere with the landowner’s current use of 
its property and did not prevent the landowner from obtaining a rea-
sonable return on its investment.
40
  Furthermore, because the courts 
had generally upheld regulations relating to air rights above build-
ings, the Court found that the ordinance did not disrupt the lan-
downer’s investment-backed expectations.
41
  The Court further found 
that the city’s regulations were “substantially related to the promotion 
of the general welfare.”
42
 
The Supreme Court applied all three Penn Central factors in the 
1987 case of Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis.
43
  In Keys-
tone, a group of coal mine operators
44
 challenged the Pennsylvania 
Subsidence Act, which required fifty percent of the coal beneath res-
idences, public buildings, and cemeteries to be kept in place as a 
means of providing surface support to those structures.
45
  The act also 
authorized the state government to revoke mining permits whenever 
coal mining damaged such structures.
46
  The basic purpose of the sta-
tute was to prevent the collapse of buildings above coal mines.
47
 
The Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute, holding 
that each of the three Penn Central factors supported the statute.
48
  As 
 
 40 Id. at 136 (finding that the “[s]everity of the impact of the law” did not support 
takings claim because the law “does not interfere in any way with the present uses of 
the Terminal” and allowed the landowner “not only to profit from the Terminal but 
also to obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”). 
 41 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130 n.27 (discussing case law that required 
the Court to reject the claim “that full use of air rights is so bound up with the in-
vestment-backed expectations of appellants that government deprivation of these rights 
invariably . . . constitutes a taking”) (emphasis added).  The Court also noted that 
because the law at issue did not interfere with the property’s current use as a railroad 
terminal, it “does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s prima-
ry expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”  Id. at 136.  
 42 Id. at 138. 
 43 480 U.S. 470.  
 44 Id. at 478.  
 45 Id. at 476–77. 
 46 Id. at 477.   
 47 See id. at 476–77 n.6.  
 48 Id. at 481, 485. 
LEWYN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:17 PM 
604 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:597 
 
to the “economic impact” and “investment-backed expectations” fac-
tors, the Court noted that the statute affected less than two percent of 
plaintiffs’ coal, much of which could not be extracted for reasons un-
related to the statute.
49
  Thus, the regulation burdened “only a small 
fraction of the property that is subjected to regulation”
50
 and there 
was “no showing that petitioners’ reasonable ‘investment-backed ex-
pectations’ have been materially affected by the additional duty to re-
tain the small percentage that must be used to support the structures 
protected by [the statute].”
51
  Considering that the minimal economic 
impact of the Pennsylvania law affected both the Court’s “reasonable 
investment-backed expectations” discussion and its “economic harm” 
discussion,  Keystone suggests that these two Penn Central factors are in-
tertwined: both relate to the degree of economic harm suffered by a 
takings plaintiff. 
As to the “character” factor, the Keystone Court held that “the 
character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily 
against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has 
acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the com-
mon welfare.”
52
  In particular, the “character” factor supported the 
state’s defense because there was no indication that the “statute [was] 
enacted solely for the benefit of private parties”
53
 or that the state was 
“exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuis-
ance.”
54
  The Court’s suggestion that a legitimate state interest sup-
ported the statute implies that the “character” factor “requires a 
weighing of public and private interests.”
55
 
Two Supreme Court decisions in 1980 and 1992 appeared to call 
Penn Central into question.
56
  In Agins, a group of landowners chal-
lenged a zoning ordinance that allowed them to build only five 
homes on a five-acre tract of land.
57
  The Court held that the ordin-
 
 49 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 496.  
 50 Id. at 499–500 n.27.  
 51 Id. at 499.  
 52 Id. at 485.  
 53 Id. at 486.  
 54 Id. at 488.  
 55 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 492 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1980)).  Note, however, that the Court’s direct statement to 
this effect is of questionable precedential value, because the Court cited the now-
overruled Agins decision.  See infra notes 91–99 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Lingle Court’s rejection of Agins).  
 56 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Agins, 447 U.S. 255. 
 57 Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.  
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ance “substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals”
58
 such 
as preventing the conversion of open space to urban use
59
 and avoid-
ing the negative results of such urbanization.
60
  The Court subse-
quently reformulated Agins to mean that a zoning ordinance is not a 
compensable taking as long as it substantially advances a legitimate 
government interest.
61
 
The Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council upheld a landowner’s takings claim challenging environmen-
tal legislation that allegedly prevented the landowner from erecting 
any permanent habitable structures on his land.
62
  The Court held 
that the legislation constituted a taking because the plaintiff was 
“called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name 
of the common good.”
63
  The Court added, however, that even con-
fiscatory regulation could avoid classification as a taking if it arose 
from background principles of property law, such as nuisance regula-
tion.
64
 
 
 58 Id. at 261.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 261 n.8 (citing the city council’s findings that urbanization might lead to 
“‘air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, dis-
turbance of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, 
and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl’”) (quoting TIBURON, CAL., 
ORDINANCE NO. 124 N.S. § 1(c) (1973)).  
 61 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (suggesting that 
Agins has been interpreted as a “stand-alone regulatory takings test that is wholly in-
dependent of Penn Central”).  Note, however, that some language in Agins suggests 
otherwise.  Later in its decision, the Agins Court pointed out that the benefits of the 
zoning ordinance “must be considered along with any diminution in market value 
that the appellants may suffer” and that the plaintiffs “are free to pursue their rea-
sonable investment expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials.”  
Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.  Because Agins referred to the “harm to plaintiff” Penn Central 
factors (economic impact on landowners and investment-backed expectations) at 
various points in its decision, see id. at 262–63, it appears that the Agins Court might 
have actually intended to apply Penn Central, rather than to create a stand-alone regu-
latory takings test. 
 62 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07, 1031–32. 
 63 Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).  
 64 Id. at 1029.  The Court explained that, even if regulation prohibits all econom-
ically beneficial use of land, it is not a taking if the regulation 
inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background prin-
ciples of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon 
land ownership.  A law or decree with such an effect must, in other 
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been 
achieved in the courts [by private plaintiffs] under the State’s law of 
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to ab-
ate nuisances that affect the public generally . . . . 
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At least one lower court decision suggested that Lucas “removed 
the weighing of public versus private interests in determining wheth-
er a taking has been effected”
65
 and that, after Lucas, any regulation 
of property value was a compensable taking unless the government 
“could articulate background principles [of property law] that prohi-
bit the uses [proposed by the landowner].”
66
 
But in 2001, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the three-
part Penn Central test in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.
67
  The Court there 
held that Lucas applied only where a regulation eliminated all eco-
nomically beneficial use of a landowner’s property, and that partial 
regulatory takings were still subject to the Penn Central three-part 
test.
68
  This three-part test required courts to consider the economic 
effect of a regulation on property owners, the regulation’s interfe-
rence with the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, and 
the character of the government action.
69
  The Court’s plurality opi-
nion did not explain the meaning of the “character” factor.  But Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurrence, which supplied the crucial fifth vote in 
Palazzolo,
70
 noted that another significant factor in takings cases “is 
the character of the government action.  The purposes served, as well 
as the effects produced, by a particular regulation inform the takings 
analysis . . . .  Regulatory takings cases ‘necessarily entai[l] complex 
factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of govern-
ment actions.’”
71
 
 
Id. 
 65 Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  
 66 Id.  Note, however, that this theory was not the most plausible interpretation of 
Lucas, given the Lucas Court’s own suggestion that, under Penn Central, “in at least 
some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with 
total loss will recover in full.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 n.8.   
 67 533 U.S. 606. 
 68 Id. at 617. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Four Justices dissented, but both the plurality opinion and O’Connor’s con-
currence reached their decision on grounds unrelated to the “character” factor.  
Compare id. at 630 (plurality opinion) (remanding the case because the “claim [was] 
not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-
imposed restriction”) with id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the view 
that state of title at the time plaintiff acquired property barred claim under “invest-
ment-backed expectations” factor).  Thus, even if Justice O’Connor’s opinion is 
treated as the opinion of the Court, her discussion of the “character” factor might be 
viewed as dictum.  
 71 Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
523 (1992)).  
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By mentioning the purposes and effects of government action, 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence suggested that courts should contin-
ue to consider the importance of the purpose animating that action, 
as well as the relationship between that purpose and the action’s eco-
nomic effects; in short, whether the government’s action effectively 
furthered an important purpose. 
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,72 the majority of the Court seemingly endorsed the Keystone 
Court and Justice O’Connor’s view of the “character” factor.  The Ta-
hoe-Sierra Court held that the three-part Penn Central test, and not the 
Lucas test, governed a temporary moratorium on real estate devel-
opment.
73
  In the course of its decision, the Court briefly explained 
that the Penn Central test “entails complex factual assessments of the 
purposes and economic effects of government actions.”
74
  The Tahoe-
Sierra Court’s reference to “purposes” implies that the purposes justi-
fying a government action are relevant when assessing that action’s 
constitutionality under Penn Central.
75
 
Between 2002 (when Tahoe-Sierra was decided) and 2005 (when 
Lingle was decided), lower courts generally agreed that the Penn Cen-
tral “character” factor required them to balance the public interest 
favoring regulation against the impact regulation had on property 
owners.
76
  For example, in Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United 
 
 72 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  
 73 See id. at 320–21.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that “the mere 
enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a property owner all 
economically beneficial use of her property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional 
obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period” and instead 
held that such regulations are “best analyzed within the Penn Central framework.”  Id. 
 74 Id. at 323 (emphasis added).   
 75 Id.  The Court, however did not address the question of whether the restric-
tions at issue were takings under Penn Central, holding only that the growth morato-
rium should be evaluated under the Penn Central test.  Id. at 317–18 (noting that the 
appropriate outcome under Penn Central was not at issue before the Court, because 
the plaintiffs had disavowed reliance on Penn Central); id. at 342 (concluding that 
“the [public] interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best served by relying on the fa-
miliar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting 
to craft a new categorical rule”).  Thus, the Court’s interpretation of Penn Central is 
arguably dicta. 
 76 See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (discussing Bass Enterprises); see 
also Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (deny-
ing takings claim in part because the government action was “designed to protect 
health and safety,” thus leaning the “character” factor in favor of the government); 
Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“In de-
termining the character of the government action, courts must . . . balance appellees’ 
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States, the plaintiffs had leased land from the federal government and 
sought permits to drill oil and gas wells on that land.
77
  The federal 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) denied the permits in 1994
78
 
because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was planning to 
acquire the lease in order to prevent drilling from affecting a nearby 
underground nuclear waste facility.
79
  After the EPA decided not to 
acquire the lease, BLM issued the permits.
80
  The plaintiffs then 
sought compensation under the Takings Clause for the delay be-
tween the BLM’s denial of the permits and their subsequent approv-
al.
81
 
The plaintiffs alleged that the Penn Central “character of the gov-
ernment action” factor supported their claim unless the govern-
ment’s action “was designed to proscribe a nuisance.”
82
  Overruling its 
own precedent,
83
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-
jected this argument, quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and 
Tahoe-Sierra.
84
  The court stated that “[a]s for the ‘character of the 
Government action’ factor, the Tahoe-Sierra Court advocated an ex-
amination of the ‘purpose and economic effect’ of the government’s 
actions . . . .  We therefore consider the purpose of the regulation 
and its desired effects in determining whether a taking has oc-
curred.”
85
  Applying this standard, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
takings claim, based partially on “the potential impact on the public 
[from] . . . drilling near a nuclear waste site.”
86
  Thus, Bass Enterprises, 
 
interests against the County’s needs to protect the public.”).  But see K & K Constr., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (focusing 
on “whether the governmental regulation singles plaintiffs out to bear the burden 
for the public good and whether the regulatory act being challenged here is a com-
prehensive, broadly based regulatory scheme that benefits and burdens all citizens 
relatively equally”). 
 77 381 F.3d 1360, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 78 Id. at 1363. 
 79 Id. at 1366–68 (describing possible dangers from drilling in more detail). 
 80 Id. at 1363–64.  
 81 Id. at 1364.  
 82 Id. at 1369.  
 83 Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1369–70 (rejecting pre-Palazzolo Federal Cir-
cuit precedent that did not treat Penn Central as good law and explaining that Palazzo-
lo “returned the temporary takings pendulum back to the familiar Penn Central analy-
sis that existed prior to Lucas”). 
 84 Id. at 1370.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
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like numerous other courts in the mid-2000s,
87
 held that partial regu-
latory takings claims generally required courts to balance a regula-
tion’s harm to the plaintiff (the “economic impact” and “investment-
backed expectations” factors) against the public interest supporting 
the regulation (the “character” factor). 
C. Lingle and Its Aftermath 
In 2005, the Supreme Court readdressed partial regulatory tak-
ings.  In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., an oil company challenged a 
Hawaii law that limited the rent the company could charge gasoline 
dealers who leased service stations from oil companies.
88
  The trial 
court held that the rent control statute failed to “substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest,”
89
 and thus constituted an unconsti-
tutional taking based on the Agins “substantially advance” test.
90
 
The Supreme Court reversed.
91
  The Court reiterated its view 
that, except under certain narrow circumstances,
92
 the Penn Central 
test governs partial regulatory takings actions.
93
  The Court proceeded 
to state that the Agins “substantially advance” test was more like the 
test governing substantive due process actions than the Penn Central 
test.
94
  Just as the Agins test requires courts to uphold any regulation 
that is “effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose,”
95
 the 
Court’s substantive due process precedent requires a court to uphold 
a regulation unless it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”
96
  By contrast, Penn Central requires the Court to consider 
 
 87 See supra note 76.  
 88 544 U.S. 528, 532–33 (2005). 
 89 Id. at 534 (citation omitted).  
 90 Id. at 531–32 (citations omitted).  
 91 Id. at 548. 
 92 These circumstances include government regulations that create a permanent 
physical invasion of a landowner’s property, regulations that render property eco-
nomically useless, and exactions (government attempts to force a landowner to dedi-
cate property to the public as a condition for obtaining a building permit).  Id. at 
538, 546–47.   
 93 Id. at 538.  
 94 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540–41.  
 95 Id. at 542 (emphasis omitted). 
 96 Id. at 541.  
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not only the reasonableness of government action, but also the im-
pact of such action on a property owner.
97
 
After pointing out this inconsistency between Agins and Penn 
Central, the Court proceeded to overrule Agins.  The Court reasoned 
that a standard that fails to address the burden government regula-
tion imposes on property rights “is tethered neither to the text of the 
Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory 
actions to be challenged under the Clause.”
98
  Because lower courts’ 
applications of the Agins test “revealed its imprecisions,” the Court 
remanded the case for further proceedings under the Penn Central 
standard.
99
 
In addition to reaffirming its commitment to the Penn Central 
test generally, the Court apparently reaffirmed its commitment to the 
“character” factor specifically, stating: “[T]he ‘character of the gov-
ernment action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical inva-
sion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to pro-
mote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a 
taking has occurred.”
100
 
Post-Lingle cases generally agree that lower courts must apply 
Penn Central to partial regulatory takings cases, but are divided as to 
the application of the Penn Central “character” factor.  These cases fall 
into three categories: (1) cases reaffirming the “private harm/public 
interest” balancing test, (2) cases holding that the “character” factor 
is limited to physical invasions and similar situations, and (3) cases 
redefining the “character” factor as an inquiry into whether a small 
number of property owners have been unfairly burdened by a gov-
ernment regulation.
101
 
 
 97 Id. at 538–39 (recognizing “the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations” as relevant factors under the Penn Central anal-
ysis (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))). 
 98 Id. at 542.  
 99 Id. at 548.  
 100 Id. at 539.  
 101 See Giovenella v. Conservation Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 462 (Mass. 
2006) (noting that some courts have focused on whether a regulation unfairly singles 
out a particular landowner while others have looked at whether a government action 
resembles a physical invasion or whether the purpose of the regulation was to miti-
gate harm to the public, and declining to resolve the issue because, under any of 
these tests, no taking occurred). 
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At least one post-Lingle decision reaffirmed the view that courts 
may balance the public interest furthered by a regulation against its 
impact on takings plaintiffs.  In Adams v. Village of Wesley Chapel, lan-
downers challenged a zoning ordinance that limited the number of 
lots into which their property could be subdivided.
102
  The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of North Carolina rejected the 
landowners’ takings claim based on Penn Central.
103
  As to the “charac-
ter” factor, the court explained: 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of local 
governments seeking to protect against overcrowding and pre-
serving the character of their areas.  Here, the Village enacted a 
land use restriction with the stated purpose “to provide for residen-
tial development at low densities consistent with suitability of the 
land and the rural character of the village.”
104
 
In other words, the court held that the “character” factor favored the 
government because its regulation effectively served a legitimate pub-
lic purpose—limiting density in order to prevent overcrowding. 
On the other hand, some decisions suggest that the “character” 
factor is primarily relevant to cases involving physical invasion of 
property.
105
  For example, in RAR Development Associates v. New Jersey 
School Construction Corp. (RAR), the state of New Jersey announced 
plans to acquire a landowner’s property and subsidized the relocation 
of one of the landowner’s tenants.
106
  Eventually, the state decided not 
to acquire the property, causing the landowner to be stuck with the 
land but no tenant.
107
  The landowner claimed that the inducements 
 
 102 No. 3:03cv411, 2006 WL 2689376, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2006); see also 
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the 
“character” factor supported a statute requiring landowners to allow visitors to store 
firearms in their vehicles, because regulation was designed to prevent “[crimes] of 
general applicability ‘concern[ing] protection of the community as a whole rather 
than individual citizens’”). 
 103 Adams, 2006 WL 2689376, at *3. 
 104 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
 105 See Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 134 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“County’s action did not physically invade or appropriate [plaintiff’s] 
property or groundwater.  Accordingly, that factor does not support a taking.”); Kaf-
ka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 28  (Mont. 2008) (“[U]nder 
the ‘character of the governmental action’ prong courts should inquire concerning 
the magnitude or character of the burden imposed by the regulation, and determine 
whether it is functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of 
private property.”); RAR Dev. Assocs. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., No. L-9424-05, 2008 
WL 2663403, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2008).   
 106 2008 WL 2663403, at *1–2.  
 107 Id. at *2.  
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the government gave to the tenant to vacate the property constituted 
a taking because they effectively deprived the landowner of a te-
nant.
108
 
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, noted that 
the “character” factor “focuses primarily on whether the conduct 
‘amounts to a physical invasion.’”
109
  The court upheld the govern-
ment’s action because its relocation assistance “did not cause a sub-
stantial destruction of the property’s beneficial use.”
110
  The state 
merely tried to acquire property for school construction in an orderly 
manner by providing affected persons with relocation assistance as 
early as possible.
111
  Because the infringement was so minor, the court 
never actually applied the “character” factor.  Thus, the RAR decision 
implies that the “character” factor might be relevant only to takings 
actions involving a physical invasion of property by the government.
112
 
A third group of cases focuses on whether “the burden of the 
regulation falls disproportionately on relatively few property own-
ers.”
113
  For example, in Wensmann Realty v. City of Eagan, a landowner 
sought to build houses on property zoned for a golf course and filed 
 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at *11.  Note that the court presumably referred to temporary physical oc-
cupations, because a permanent physical occupation of property by government is 
always a taking, and courts therefore need not apply the Penn Central test in such sit-
uations.  See id.  
 110 Id. at *13. 
 111 Id. at *13.  The court explained,  
The governmental action here consisted of a good faith effort by the 
State to act within the confines of the relevant statutory sections and 
administrative regulations to acquire property for the construction of a 
school.  Extended lead time was needed for [the tenant’s] relocation, 
and the orderly process of the intended acquisition of plaintiff’s im-
proved property necessitated its early provision of relocation assistance. 
Id. 
 112 Because no reported cases have cited RAR, the precise scope of the New Jersey 
court’s holding remains unclear.  Cf. infra Parts III.B.1, IV.B.1 (critiquing “physical 
invasion” theory).  
 113 Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007); see 
also Small Prop. Owners of S.F. v. City & County of S.F., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 136 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding ordinance as “part of a broader scheme of allocat-
ing economic benefits and burdens between landlords and tenants for the public 
good,” but without directly addressing impact of Lingle on the “character” factor); cf. 
Tapps Brewing Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2007) 
(where landowners challenged a city regulation forcing them to pay fees to fund an 
upgrade to the city’s pipe system, “character” factor supported city because 
“[p]laintiffs fail[ed] to provide any evidence showing that the City has not required 
any other land owner to upgrade the pipe system”).   
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a lawsuit after the city rejected its application for rezoning.
114
  The 
court interpreted the Lingle Court’s statement that takings jurispru-
dence should consider “how that burden is allocated”
115
 to mean that 
courts should not balance the harm to a takings plaintiff against the 
public interest favoring regulation because “the appropriate focus of 
the character inquiry should be on the nature rather than on the me-
rit of the governmental action.”
116
  Therefore, the court asserted that 
“an important consideration involves whether the regulation is gen-
eral in application or whether the burden of the regulation falls dis-
proportionately on relatively few property owners.”
117
  In other words, 
Wensmann suggests that, in some circumstances, the “character” fac-
tor favors compensation when only a few owners are harmed by gov-
ernment regulation and disfavors compensation when the burden of 
regulation is widely distributed across society.
118
 
Applying this standard, the court held that the “character” factor 
favored the landowner for two reasons.  First, only a few private prop-
erty owners were subject to the zoning category that included golf 
courses (“Parks, Open Space, and Regulation”).
119
  Second, the city 
allowed other land near the golf course to be used for residential de-
velopment.
120
  Thus, the costs of regulation disproportionately af-
fected the plaintiff rather than being allocated broadly across socie-
ty.
121
 
III. WHY PRECEDENT FAVORS A “PRIVATE HARM/PUBLIC INTEREST” 
BALANCING TEST 
As explained above, the weight of pre-Lingle precedent interprets 
the Penn Central “character of the government action” factor to sup-
port consideration of the public interest favoring regulation.  Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo endorsed this view, as did the 
Court’s opinion in Tahoe-Sierra. 
Moreover, Lingle itself may reaffirm the “private harm/public in-
terest” test.  As noted above, the Lingle Court stated that “the ‘charac-
 
 114 734 N.W.2d at 628–29. 
 115 Id. at 639 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005)).  
 116 Id. (citations omitted).  
 117 Id. at 639.  
 118 See infra Parts III.B.2, IV.B.2 (critiquing this theory).  
 119 Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 640.  
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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ter of the government action’—for instance whether it amounts to a 
physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through 
‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of econom-
ic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning 
whether a taking has occurred.”
122
  The Lingle Court’s reference to the 
“common good” suggests that the extent to which a regulation in fact 
“promotes the common good” is relevant to the “character” factor. 
Yet several commentators argue that Lingle bars any inquiry into 
the broader public interests supporting regulation.  Some contend 
that Lingle implicitly eliminates the “character of the government ac-
tion” factor altogether,
123
 while others suggest that Lingle radically re-
defined the “character” factor.
124
 
A. Does Character Count at All? 
The Lingle Court noted that its rejection of Agins “[did] not re-
quire [the Court] to disturb any of [its] prior holdings”
125
 (other 
than, presumably, Agins itself).  Nevertheless, Professor Dale Whit-
man argues that “if Lingle is taken seriously, it appears to destroy the 
‘character of the governmental action’ prong of the Penn Central tak-
ings test.”
126
  In support of this statement, Whitman focuses on the 
Lingle Court’s statement that Penn Central “focuses directly upon the 
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private proper-
ty rights.”
127
  According to Whitman, this statement excludes inquiry 
into “the government’s reasons or motivations for taking regulatory 
action.”
128
 
But the Lingle Court’s statement that Penn Central “focuses direct-
ly upon the severity of the burden”
129
 need not necessarily bar consid-
eration of other factors, such as the character of the government ac-
tion.  Considering that two of the three Penn Central factors address 
the burden of government regulation on the plaintiff,
130
 the Penn Cen-
 
 122 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added).  
 123 See infra Part III.A.   
 124 See infra Part III.B.  
 125 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.  
 126 Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle, Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 573, 574 (2007).  
 127 Id. at 581 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).  
 128 Id.   
 129 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.  
 130 These factors are the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
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tral Court most likely intended to focus on that burden.  But empha-
sizing the burden on takings plaintiffs does not require courts to fo-
cus solely on that burden.  Both the Penn Central and Lingle Courts’ 
explicit references to “the character of the government action”
131
 sug-
gest otherwise. 
Whitman also relies on the Lingle Court’s statement that Penn 
Central “turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of 
a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes 
with legitimate property interests.”
132
  According to Whitman, this 
“language omits any reference to the third prong of Penn Central, the 
‘character’ test, and it inserts the [“not exclusively”] language pre-
cisely because, I suspect, O’Connor [the author of Lingle] realized 
that the unmentioned ‘character’ prong was inconsistent with the 
Lingle opinion and could not survive it.”
133
  In other words, Whitman 
argues that when the Court said liability does “not exclusively” turn 
on the two “harm to plaintiff” factors (economic impact and interfe-
rence with investment-backed expectations), then it must have meant 
that liability does exclusively turn on those factors.  But the Court said 
that takings cases do “not exclusively” depend on the two “harm to 
plaintiff” factors, thus it must have intended another factor to be re-
levant; and by reiterating its commitment to the “character” factor,
134
 
the Court seemingly held that the character of the government action 
is the third factor. 
Professor Eric Pearson, by contrast, concedes that Lingle explicit-
ly reaffirmed the Penn Central “character” factor,
135
 but nevertheless 
argues that Lingle “effectively eviscerates the ‘character of the gov-
ernment action’ factor of Penn Central.”
136
  Pearson reasons that the 
character factor and the Agins “substantially advance” test “inquire of 
the behavior of government rather than of the harm to property that 
behavior might produce.”
137
  Thus, both tests “reside in the universe 
of substantive due process. . . .  Given that identity of purpose and ef-
 
ment-backed expectations.”  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978).  
 131 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.   
 132 Whitman, supra note 126, at 582 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540).  
 133 Id.  
 134 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.  
 135 Eric Pearson, Some Thoughts on the Role of Substantive Due Process in the Federal 
Constitutional Law of Property Rights Protection, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008).  
 136 Id.  
 137 Id.  
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fect, Lingle’s condemnation of the Agins test per force condemns the 
Penn Central character factor as well.”
138
 
But there is a difference between the Penn Central and Agins 
tests.  The Lingle Court suggested that under the Agins “substantially 
advance” test, the constitutionality of a government regulation rests 
solely on its rationality, regardless of its impact on private property 
owners.
139
  By contrast, the Penn Central test considers the character of 
government action as just one factor among several.
140
  Thus, the ba-
lancing test is no more identical to substantive due process than is  
any of the other balancing tests within constitutional jurisprudence.
141
  
If Penn Central is identical to substantive due process, so are balanc-
ing tests in (for example) the First Amendment context. 
To understand the difference between substantive due process 
and a true balancing test, imagine the following hypothetical: sup-
pose the government has an excellent reason to enact a regulation 
that reduces the value of a landowner’s property by ninety percent.  
Under the “substantially advance” test, the landowner’s takings claim 
fails; the government prevails because it had a substantial basis for its 
decision.  By contrast, under a “private harm/public interest” balanc-
ing test, the government’s excellent reason would be balanced 
against the burden it imposes on the plaintiff, which means that the 
government might actually lose the case.  Thus, the substantive due 
process/”substantially advance” test rejected in Lingle is quite differ-
ent from the balancing test that Pearson criticizes.  Moreover, Lingle 
does not preclude the latter test. 
 
 138 Id.  
 139 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–42 (2005).  
 140 See Pearson, supra note 135, at 25.  Pearson contends that 
Penn Central designates three factors for balancing—economic harm, 
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of 
the government action.  The problem is this: the first two factors . . . re-
late to the exercise of government power in a particular case.  They in-
quire whether the government’s regulation, when applied to an indi-
vidual, so harms that individual as to cause a taking.  The character 
factor, on the other hand, typically relates not at all to the specific ex-
ercise of government power implicated in a case.  Rather, this latter 
factor assesses the worthiness of a statute as a general matter. 
Id. 
 141 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006) (describing Fourth 
Amendment balancing of interests); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) 
(requiring a balancing of the parties’ interests where a public employer terminated 
an employee for engaging in speech and the employee brought a First Amendment 
action).  
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Professor Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, and Guillermo 
Montero argue that even if substantive due process could be distin-
guished in theory from the “private harm/public interest” balancing 
test, the Lingle Court itself equated the two standards.
142
  The authors 
rely on the following language from Lingle: 
[W]hether a regulation of private property is effective in achiev-
ing some legitimate public purpose . . . has some logic in the con-
text of a due process challenge . . . [b]ut such a test is not a valid 
method of discerning whether private property has been ‘taken’ 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
143
 
But a look at the full context of the quoted language yields a more 
nuanced conclusion.  Starting from the beginning of the first quoted 
sentence, the relevant portion of Lingle reads: 
 Although Agins’ reliance on due process precedents is unders-
tandable, the language the Court selected was regrettably impre-
cise.  The “substantially advances” formula suggests a means-ends 
test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is 
effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose.  An inquiry 
of this nature has some logic in the context of a due process chal-
lenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate govern-
mental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul 
of the Due Process Clause.  But such a test is not a valid method 
of discerning whether private property has been “taken” for pur-
poses of the Fifth Amendment.
144
 
The quoted language undeniably rejects the idea that any regulation 
satisfying due process (i.e. any non-arbitrary regulation) is also per-
missible under the Takings Clause.  But Lingle did not reject the ba-
lancing test proposed by Justice O’Connor in Palazzolo, which treats 
the regulation’s effectiveness in achieving a public purpose as just 
one of numerous factors to be considered in ascertaining the validity 
 
 142 Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord, Please 
Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Cen-
tral Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 46 (2005) (arguing that Lingle forecloses 
“consideration of the extent to which a challenged regulation actually serves the gov-
ernment interests sought to be advanced”).   
 143 Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542).  Unlike Pearson, Lawson and his col-
leagues seek to redefine the “character” factor rather than eliminate it.  See infra Part 
IV.B.1 (describing and critiquing their proposed test).  This Part addresses Lawson 
and his colleagues’ critique of the balancing test because their argument is similar to 
Pearson’s.  
 144 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (citation omitted).  
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of the regulation.
145
  Under the “substantially advances” formula, any 
truly legitimate purpose that in fact supports a regulation automati-
cally safeguards the government against takings claims.  But under 
the “private harm/public interest” balancing test, a regulation’s legi-
timate purpose is merely part of the mix of factors to be considered 
by the courts. 
B. If the “Character” Element Survives Lingle, What Does It Mean? 
Given that Lingle retains the three-part Penn Central test, does it 
allow lower courts to consider the legitimacy of state interests as part 
of the “character of the government action” assessment?  There are 
two reasons to believe that it does. 
First, the Lingle Court itself suggested that whether a regulation 
“affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good’” may be a relevant consideration in the “character” analysis.
146
  
This language implies that a regulation’s effectiveness in facilitating 
the “common good” may be relevant when assessing its “character.”  
Second, Justice O’Connor, the same Justice who most vigorously af-
firmed the “private harm/public interest” balancing test in Palazzo-
lo,
147
 wrote the majority opinion in Lingle.
148
  If Justice O’Connor in-
tended an about-face, she probably would have been more explicit 
about her choice. 
Nevertheless, numerous commentators argue that the Lingle 
Court repudiated the test balancing the public interest against the 
plaintiff’s regulation-related harm in takings actions.  Some argue 
that Lingle limited the “character” factor to physical occupations of 
property by government,
149
 while others argue that Lingle redefined 
the “character” factor as a requirement that courts focus on whether 
regulation disproportionately burdens a small group of property 
owners.
150
  The following analysis will address each of these theories. 
 
 145 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring); supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.  
 146 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978)).  The Court noted that the issue “may be relevant in discerning 
whether a taking has occurred.”  Id.  
 147 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra notes 70–71 
and accompanying text.  
 148 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 530. 
 149 See infra Part III.B.1.  
 150 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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1. Does Lingle Limit the “Character” Factor to “Physical 
Invasions”? 
In their hornbook on land use, Juergensmeyer and Roberts 
state, 
In Lingle, the Court did not refer to a multi-factor balancing test.  
Rather, when reciting the Penn Central factors, the Lingle Court 
gave a physical invasion as its example of the character factor 
[and therefore] the government ought not be able to argue the 
importance of its regulation’s purpose in defense.
151
 
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, stated 
that the “character” factor “focuses primarily on whether the conduct 
‘amounts to a physical invasion.’”
152
  Such references appear to ema-
nate from the following passage in Lingle: “the ‘character of the go-
vernmental action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical inva-
sion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to pro-
mote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a 
taking has occurred.”
153
 
If the Lingle Court intended to hold that the “character” factor 
was relevant only to physical invasions, it could have done so quite 
easily by writing: “The ‘character of the government action’ factor 
means that a taking has presumably occurred if government action 
amounts to a physical invasion, but is irrelevant if no physical invasion 
occurred.”  Instead, the Court created a dichotomy between regula-
tions amounting to a physical invasion, which are more likely to be 
considered takings,
154
 and public programs “adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”
155
  It 
follows that even after Lingle, courts may weigh a regulation’s effect 
on the “common good” against the economic harm it causes. 
2. Does Lingle Redefine “Character” as an Unfair Burden? 
The Lingle Court noted that one reason it rejected the “substan-
tially advance” test was because the “inquiry reveals nothing about the 
 
 151 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.6, at 430 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. 
at 539).  
 152 RAR Dev. Assocs. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., No. L-9424-05, 2008 WL 2663403, 
at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2008) (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).    
 153 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978)) (emphasis added). 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id.  
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magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes 
upon private property rights.  Nor does it provide any information 
about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property own-
ers.”
156
  According to Christopher Goodin, this language means that 
because the effectiveness of a regulation in achieving a legitimate 
public purpose “does not reveal either the burdens imposed or the 
benefits conferred by a regulation . . . inquiry into effectiveness of a 
regulation is invalid in the context of takings challenges.”
157
  Goodin 
points out the Lingle Court’s statement that “[t]he owner of a proper-
ty subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state inter-
est may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a 
property subject to an ineffective regulation.”
158
 
In other words, Goodin seems to adopt the following syllogism: 
Premise 1: In regulatory takings actions, courts may consider the 
question of whether government regulation singles out a property 
owner for an unfair burden—a principle violated by the “substantially 
advance” test. 
Premise 2: A “private harm/public interest” balancing test fails 
to adequately address the question of whether a regulation singles 
out a property owner for an unfair burden.  Thus, it is just as incon-
sistent with Lingle as the “substantially advance” test. 
Conclusion: The Lingle Court therefore would reject such a ba-
lancing test. 
Premise 1 is undeniably supported by the Penn Central Court’s 
statement that the Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,”
159
 and 
therefore a taking occurs “when ‘justice and fairness’ require that 
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on 
a few persons.”
160
  Thus, the Takings Clause does not bar considera-
tion of whether a property owner was singled out for regulation.
161
 
 
 156 Id. at 542. 
 157 Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the Governmental 
Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 437, 444 
(2007); see also cases cited supra note 105. 
 158 Goodin, supra note 157, at 444 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543). 
 159 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.  
 160 Id. at 124.  
 161 Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
20–28 (2008) (articulating theoretical justifications for considering this factor).  
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But Premise 2 is flawed.  Even a balancing test that considers the 
public purpose supporting a government regulation can consider the 
fairness of burdening a small group of property owners to further 
that public purpose.  As Justice O’Connor wrote in her Palazzolo con-
currence: 
[T]his constitutional guarantee is “‘designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”  
The concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings 
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate.  Accordingly, we 
have eschewed “any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice 
and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public ac-
tion be compensated by the government, rather than remain dis-
proportionately concentrated on a few persons.” . . . 
 We have “identified several factors that have particular signific-
ance” in these “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”  Two such 
factors are “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the clai-
mant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has in-
terfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”  Another 
is “the character of the governmental action.”  The purposes 
served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular regulation 
inform the takings analysis.
162
 
In the first few sentences of the above passage, Justice O’Connor 
emphasizes that the Takings Clause is designed to prevent “forcing 
some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”
163
  But she then proceeds 
to cite to sources which state that in deciding what fairness requires, 
courts may consider “the purposes and economic effects of govern-
ment actions.”
164
  Thus, Justice O’Connor saw no contradiction be-
tween protecting property owners from unfair burdens and weighing 
the state interests that justify those burdens. 
Justice O’Connor’s view makes sense.  Even if courts do not ad-
dress the existence of unfair burdens when addressing the “charac-
ter” factor, such unfairness may be relevant when analyzing the “eco-
nomic harm to the property owner” element of Penn Central.
165
  If a 
 
 162 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (internal citations omitted).  
 163 Id. at 633 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123–24).  
 164 Id. at 634 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).  
 165 Alternatively, courts could interpret the “character” factor to require consider-
ation of both the public interest underlying the regulation and the extent to which 
plaintiffs are disproportionately burdened by regulation.  But given the vagueness of 
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land use regulation reduces a plaintiff’s property value by ninety per-
cent, the plaintiff has likely been disproportionately burdened—
unless every nearby owner of similar property has also suffered a ni-
nety percent loss due to government regulation, a result that is likely 
to occur only when the plaintiff seeks to use his land in the same way 
as all owners of similar property.
166
 
Two hypothetical situations illustrate how land use regulation 
that singles out a landowner for disproportionate burdens is likely to 
be accompanied by a significant economic impact upon that plaintiff.  
In case A, landowner A lost fifty percent of her property’s resale value 
due to a government regulation restricting development.  But nearby 
landowners suffered similar losses.  In this situation, A’s land may be 
less marketable than before in comparison to property in other cities, 
but her land is no less marketable in relation to her neighbors’ prop-
erty. 
In case B, landowner B’s land lost fifty percent of its long-term 
resale value, but unlike  landowner A in the first hypothetical, B is the 
only property owner in her town who cannot develop her land.  Thus, 
“the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately”
167
 on B.  In this 
case, landowner B is worse off not only in absolute terms, but also in 
relation to other nearby landowners.  Someone looking to buy land 
in B’s town will prefer other landowners’ land to B’s, because the 
former is not restricted by government regulation.  It logically follows 
that landowner B suffered a greater economic harm than landowner 
A precisely because a land use regulation singled out B. 
This illustration demonstrates how, contrary to Premise 2 above, 
a “singled out” plaintiff such as B has an unusually strong case under 
the “economic harm” prong of Penn Central—even if the Court con-
tinues to focus the “character” prong on the public interest justifying 
regulation.  If courts indirectly consider B’s interest in avoiding being 
singled out under the “economic harm” prong of Penn Central, it is 
 
both concepts, requiring courts to regularly balance the two factors may be more 
confusing than the balancing test addressed in the text.  See infra Part IV.B.2 (ex-
plaining why the “unfair burden” concept is so confusing that it should generally not 
be the primary focus of judicial inquiry).    
 166 In fact, zoning often increases, rather than decreases, property values.  See Tim-
lin Kate Sanders, Making Landowners Whole Without Putting Holes in Zoning: Personal 
Waivers as the Solution to the Partial Regulatory Takings Compensation Issue, 15 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 513, 541 (2008) (“[T]he cost of housing has risen dramatically higher 
than the actual construction cost of homes in the past thirty years, and research 
shows a correlation between zoning and inflated housing prices.”). 
 167 Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007).  
LEWYN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:17 PM 
2010] CHARACTER COUNTS 623 
 
essentially double counting to consider the same interest under the 
“character” prong.  Accordingly, the “private harm/public interest” 
balancing test is consistent with protecting singled out property own-
ers. 
IV. BUT IS BALANCING INTERESTS GOOD POLICY? 
Given the apparent ambiguity of Lingle, lower courts may have 
discretion to consider public policy in interpreting the “character” 
factor.  As explained above, pre-Lingle courts often balanced the eco-
nomic harm government regulation imposed on a property owner, 
the disruption to the property owner’s investment-backed expecta-
tions, and the extent to which the regulation effectively promoted the 
public interest.
168
 
The affirmative case for continuing to follow this “private 
harm/public interest” balancing test is simple: as long as courts are 
required to implement the inherently vague Penn Central balancing 
test,
169
 they should also consider the public interest because it is some-
thing courts know how to do.  In a wide variety of contexts, courts use 
balancing tests to determine whether the broader public interest fa-
vors a plaintiff’s claim or a defendant’s defense.
170
  The fact that 
 
 168 See supra notes 8, 76–87 and accompanying text.  
 169 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.6, at 429 (Penn Central’s “inde-
terminate factors provide little guidance to individuals”); id. § 10.7, at 431 (“The 
Court has not defined ‘investment-backed expectations.’”); id. at 433 (“‘[T]here is 
no readily identifiable pattern to state court investment-backed expectations deci-
sions.’” (quoting J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Investment-
Backed Land Use Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 110 
(2006))).  
 170 See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 378 (2008) 
(requiring courts to consider “the balance of equities and the public interest,” 
among other factors, when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction); 
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (requiring 
courts to “balance the family’s privacy interest against the public interest in disclo-
sure” when interpreting a Freedom of Information Act provision prohibiting the 
government from disclosing law enforcement records that would constitute “an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–
300 (1999) (requiring courts to “evaluate [a] search or seizure under traditional 
standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it in-
trudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” when historical 
analysis does not dictate whether a particular government action violates the Fourth 
Amendment); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring courts to 
consider a variety of factors, including both the recipient’s interest and “the Gov-
ernment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement [preferred by the 
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courts are accustomed to such balancing favors treating the “charac-
ter of the public action” as “the strength of the public interest favor-
ing the government’s regulation,” either alone or in combination 
with other factors. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that either the “private 
harm/public interest” balancing test should be rejected on other 
grounds or that alternative tests are just as practical.  The following 
analysis will address each of these contentions. 
A. Is Balancing Fair? 
Goodin contends that any balancing test that considers the pur-
pose of a regulation creates an unfair distinction between a landown-
er who loses property through eminent domain and a landowner 
whose property is rendered less valuable by a less intrusive regulation; 
specifically, he argues that if the public need does not immunize gov-
ernment from its duty to compensate in an eminent domain action, 
there is no compelling reason to treat regulatory takings actions dif-
ferently.
171
 
In fact, regulatory takings and eminent domain takings are quite 
different and should be governed by different rules.  In an eminent 
domain action, a landowner loses the physical use of his property.  
The landowner’s loss is so complete that it makes sense to compen-
sate him fully for his loss regardless of the public interest involved.  
By contrast, a partial regulatory takings plaintiff can still use her land, 
even if she cannot exploit that land to its full economic potential.  
Unless courts hold that reductions in value, or all reductions above a 
 
recipient] would entail” when deciding whether the termination of government ben-
efits violates due process). 
 171 See Goodin, supra note 158, at 446 (contending that any Takings Clause test 
that considers the public interest underlying regulation “forces courts to unfairly dis-
criminate against regulatory takings claimants. This stems from the disparate impact 
that results when condemnees (eminent domain) are approached differently than 
inverse condemnees (regulatory takings)”).  John Echeverria rejects relying directly 
on the purpose of government regulation because 
[i]t would make no sense in a condemnation case, for example, to sug-
gest that the government should be excused from its obligation to pay 
for a school site because the school will serve a vital educational need.  
Likewise, . . . it makes no sense to suggest that the government’s liabili-
ty to pay compensation on account of its regulatory actions should vary 
with the importance of the public purpose served by the regulation. 
John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 
206 (2005). 
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certain level,
172
 are always compensable,
173
 they must adopt some kind 
of test to determine which landowner losses are compensable takings 
and which are not.  This means that courts must treat partial regula-
tory takings differently from eminent domain takings.  The Supreme 
Court apparently agrees; Lingle and its predecessors held that litiga-
tion involving a less-than-total loss is governed by the three-factor 
Penn Central test, rather than by rules governing eminent domain ac-
tions. 
174
 
B. Are the Alternatives Any Better? 
Commentators who assert that Lingle rejects the “private 
harm/public interest” balancing test generally propose defining the 
“character of the government action” prong as an analysis of (a) the 
government action’s similarity to physical invasions and/or other 
government actions generally recognized as takings, and (b) the ex-
tent to which the government action singled out a small number of 
property owners for regulation.
175
  The following analysis argues that 
these proposed standards are either less practical than the “private 
harm/public interest” test or harder to square with Supreme Court 
precedent. 
 
 172 This would be the case if the Court held that all losses above a certain percen-
tage (e.g., ninety percent of resale value) were compensable.  The Court, however, 
appears to have rejected this view in Palazzolo.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 616 (requiring application of the Penn Central balancing test, even though the 
plaintiff lost ninety-three percent of his property’s resale value due to regulation; his 
parcel would be worth over $3.1 million if fully developed, but retained only 
$200,000 in development value as a result of regulation).  
 173 Indeed, some theorists argue that any reduction in property value is a com-
pensable “taking.”  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholar-
ship?, 30 STAN. L. REV. 635, 640 (1978) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977)) (“Any diminution of rights in the bundle of 
any holder . . . amounts to a taking under the law.”).  But for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, I assume that the Supreme Court will continue to follow its current precedent 
rather than adopt such theories.  Whether such precedent correctly interprets the 
Takings Clause is beyond the scope of this Article.   
 174 See supra Parts II.B, II.C.   
 175 See infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.  In addition, Whitman proposes that courts con-
sider public purpose by considering the “necessity” of a regulation as a defense to a 
taking claim.  See Whitman, supra note 132, at 589–90.  Whitman reasons that existing 
precedent allows “background principles of nuisance and property law [to provide] a 
defense to a takings claim,” id. at 582, and that public necessity is such a “background 
principle.”  Id. at 589–90.  This test, however, as Professor Whitman explains, pre-
supposes that the Lingle Court meant to eliminate the “character of the government 
action” element of Penn Central—a conclusion that I reject.  See id. at 581–82.  
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1. The Problem with “Physical Invasion” Tests 
Lawson and his colleagues assert that the most plausible under-
standing of the “character” factor is that “it is designed to evaluate 
the extent to which the government action resembles what has been 
uncontroversially understood to constitute a taking.”
176
  They contend 
that 
it is sensible to envision a continuum along which government ac-
tions at one end, such as permanent physical occupations, effect a 
taking per se because they closely resemble the formal exercise of 
the eminent domain power, whereas government actions at the 
other end, such as routine land use regulations, almost certainly 
would not effect a taking.
177
 
Under this approach, if a regulation somehow resembles a perma-
nent physical occupation, the “character” factor kicks in.  If not, the 
“character” factor is irrelevant. 
This version of the “character” test is fairly easy to apply when 
the government temporarily occupies property.
178
  In that situation, a 
court can define the “character” factor as the length of the occupa-
tion and then balance it against the economic loss to the plaintiff: 
high economic loss
179
 plus long occupation equals a taking; low eco-
nomic loss plus short occupation equals no taking; high economic 
loss plus short occupation, or low economic loss plus long occupa-
tion, equals a close case. 
But what if a landowner challenges a development restriction ra-
ther than a physical occupation?  In that case, according to Lawson 
and his colleagues, the government’s action is presumably a “routine 
land use regulation” in which case the “character” factor disappears 
and there is nothing against which to weigh the two “harm to plain-
tiff” factors (economic impact plus disruption of investment-backed 
expectations).  How can courts weigh two similar factors against noth-
ing?  Only by dramatically reshaping Penn Central. 
 
 176 Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra note 142, at 46.   
 177 Id.; see also D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Im-
pact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 343, 354 n.55 (2005) (endorsing this test).  
 178 If the government permanently occupies property, its action is automatically a 
compensable taking and Penn Central is irrelevant.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV, Inc., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
 179 This not only includes the direct decrease in the plaintiff’s property value, but 
also the effect, if any, on her reasonable investment-backed expectations.  
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For example, courts could hold that if the landowner’s losses ex-
ceed a certain threshold amount,
180
 a taking exists, even though the 
“character” factor is irrelevant.  But in Palazzolo, the Court indicated 
that compensation may not be necessary even when the regulation 
caused a ninety-three percent loss in property value.
181
  Thus, such a 
test might be difficult to square with Supreme Court precedent.  Al-
ternatively, courts could hold that there is presumptively no taking if 
a landowner suffers a less-than-total loss in value from “routine” regu-
lation, because the “character” factor is irrelevant and the landown-
er’s interests are not strong enough to support his takings claim.
182
  
This rule would certainly be easy to apply, but it would be inconsis-
tent with the Penn Central Court’s intent to base regulatory takings 
decisions on “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”
183
  The Lingle 
Court indicated that it agreed with Penn Central’s assertion that it  was 
“unable to develop any ‘set formula for evaluating regulatory takings 
claims.’”
184
  Thus, Lingle also seems to prefer ad hoc balancing to 
“bright line” tests.  Accordingly, any attempt to draw a line between 
physical occupations and “routine” regulations might be inconsistent 
with both Penn Central and Lingle. 
2. Pure Reciprocity and “Reciprocity Plus” 
Numerous commentators define the “character” factor as reci-
procity—the extent to which the burdens of regulation are fairly 
shared across the population.  This test has the advantage of being at 
least somewhat consistent with precedent; the Court has repeatedly 
 
 180 Another option is multiple thresholds: one in cases where the landowner’s rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations have been adversely affected by government 
regulation, and a higher threshold where the landowner’s expectations, if any, were 
unreasonable.  
 181 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001); see also Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (diminution in value at 87.5 percent but not compensa-
ble).  
 182 Professor Lawson and his colleagues suggest that “routine land use regulations 
. . . almost certainly would not effect a taking.”  Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra 
note 142, at 46.  
 183 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reaffirming commitment 
to ad hoc balancing); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978).  
 184 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent., 
438 U.S. at 124).  
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referred to reciprocity in its Takings Clause decisions.
185
  But the ma-
jor reciprocity-based tests that have been proposed add additional le-
vels of complexity to an already complex status quo and add little val-
ue to the simpler balancing test proposed above.  Goodin and John 
Echeverria proposed the most detailed reciprocity-based tests. 
Goodin argues that a regulation’s fairness should be inferred 
from five factors: 
(1) Reciprocity of advantage.  That is, whether a takings plaintiff 
benefits from other regulations,
186
 or “has been unfairly singled out to 
shoulder a disproportionate share of public burdens without corres-
ponding benefits.”
187
 
(2) Whether a regulation abrogates a basic property right, such 
as the rights of “exclusive possession, use, and disposition.”
188
 
(3) Whether a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a regulatory bur-
den.
189
 
(4) Whether a plaintiff’s proposed land use constitutes a nuis-
ance.
190
 
(5) The existence of “rational retroactivity.”  That is, to the ex-
tent regulation is retroactive, whether past benefits implicitly com-
pensate a takings plaintiff for any harm done by regulation.
191
 
In other words, Goodin proposes five factors for the final prong 
of the three-part Penn Central test, thereby multiplying the complexity 
of the law.  Moreover, not all of these elements are tremendously 
clear.  How can a court decide when a land use regulation creates 
“reciprocity of advantage”?  Goodin asserts that “[s]o long as the or-
dinance applies broadly to other people in the surrounding commu-
nity, the landowner is also benefitted by the restrictions that the or-
dinance places upon his neighbors.”
192
  But how broadly should one 
 
 185 See Alan Romero, Ends and Means In Takings Law After Lingle v. Chevron, 23 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 333, 363 (2008) (discussing relevant precedent in more de-
tail).  
 186 Goodin, supra note 158, at 447. 
 187 Id. at 449.  
 188 Id. at 450.  
 189 Id. at 452–53. 
 190 Id. at 454.  
 191 Id. at 456.   But see Echeverria, supra note 171, at 201–02 (asserting that retroac-
tivity is irrelevant after Lingle,  because Lingle held that “a legitimate governmental 
action is a precondition for a valid taking claim” and retroactivity, as an issue related 
to the “legitimacy” of government action, is only relevant to due process claims). 
 192 Goodin, supra note 158, at 447–48.  
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define these restrictions?  Does reciprocity exist whenever a bur-
dened landowner’s neighbors are covered by some sort of zoning 
regulation?
193
  Does it exist only when the landowner’s neighbors are 
subject to the identical zoning classification?
194
  Or does it exist only 
when the plaintiff’s neighbors suffer just as much from the zoning 
classification as the plaintiff?  And which landowners should be in-
cluded in the group “burdened” by the zoning regulation—all lan-
downers covered by the regulation, only those who have lost some 
value, or only those who have lost the most value?
195
 
And when is government regulation “voluntarily assumed” by a 
plaintiff?  The only relevant land-use regulation case cited by Goo-
din,
196
 Yee v. City of Escondido, upheld a rent control ordinance and 
noted that the landlords “voluntarily rented their land to [te-
nants].”
197
  Goodin notes that the landlords “implicitly accepted the 
restrictions imposed upon them by . . . failing to seek a zoning 
change.”
198
  Does this mean that a landowner automatically accepts 
the regulatory status quo if he or she fails to seek a rezoning?  And if 
so, does this mean that the “character” factor will normally favor a 
takings plaintiff who unsuccessfully seeks a rezoning? 
Echeverria proposes a seemingly less complex two-part “reci-
procity plus” test, arguing that, except in certain unusual circums-
tances,
199
 the “character” element of Penn Central requires courts to 
examine (a) reciprocity (i.e., “whether the regulation targets one or a 
 
 193 See Romero, supra note 185, at 369 (“Some have argued that even if a particular 
regulation does not directly benefit the burdened owner by restraining others, every 
rational land use regulation makes a better community and thus benefits every citi-
zen and every property in the community, including the regulated owners and their 
property.”).  But see Barros, supra note 177, at 354 n.56 (criticizing such arguments as 
unrealistic; for example, if only wetland-property owners are affected by wetlands 
regulation, those “property owners bear all the burdens of the regulation while ob-
taining only a fraction of the public benefit”).  
 194 Goodin seems to adopt this view by suggesting that the landmark preservation 
law in Penn Central “secured an average reciprocity of advantage for the railroad 
owner, because the law effected the designation of over four-hundred landmarks, 
many of which were located nearby the terminal.”  Goodin, supra note 158, at 448. 
 195 Cf. Davidson, supra note 161, at 39–40 (“[T]he class of ‘differentially burdened 
property holders’ is entirely malleable.”).  
 196 Goodin, supra note 158, at 452–53.  
 197 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992).  
 198 Goodin, supra note 158, at 453.  
 199 Echeverria points out that where government physically occupies private prop-
erty or limits the right to devise property to heirs, the “character” factor favors recov-
ery under the Takings Clause, even if the factors discussed below are irrelevant.  See 
Echeverria, supra note 171, at 203–04.  
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few owners or is more general in application”)
200
 and (b) “whether a 
regulation is benefit-conferring or harm-preventing.”
201
 
As to the first factor, Echeverria provides a simple example: if a 
community creates an agricultural zone to limit development, but the 
zone encompasses only one farm, the “character” factor supports the 
farmer’s takings claim.
202
  But the extent to which a landowner is dis-
proportionately burdened may not always be so clear.  Suppose, for 
example, that there are ten homeowners on a block zoned for low-
density residential property.  One of the homeowners wishes to build 
a slightly higher density residence—for example, by adding an extra 
room to be used as a rental unit.  The zoning regulation precludes 
this renovation, which reduces the potential resale value of the 
homeowner’s property by ten percent.  A second homeowner wants 
to demolish her house and build a factory.  The zoning regulation 
prohibits this project, which reduces the potential resale value of the 
property by ninety percent. 
Even if the two homeowners are the only people burdened by 
the low-density zoning regulation,
203
 the proper fate of their possible 
takings claims is unclear.  Were both homeowners equally burdened?  
Or is the more ambitious homeowner—the one who wanted to build 
a factory—more heavily burdened?  If the former is correct, then two 
different situations are being treated the same.  If the latter is correct, 
then the homeowner who seeks to radically change the neighbor-
hood is in a stronger litigating position than the one who wishes to 
make a small improvement—hardly a desirable result.
204
  In sum, 
 
 200 Id. at 204.  The Minnesota Supreme Court seems to have adopted a test similar 
to that proposed by Echeverria, at least insofar as it relates to the burden of the regu-
lation; see Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007) 
(requiring similar considerations of “whether the regulation is general in application 
or whether the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately on relatively few 
property owners”).  
 201 Echeverria, supra note 171, at 207.  
 202 Id. at 204–05; see also Wensmann Realty, 734 N.W.2d at 640 (finding that the re-
ciprocity element favored the plaintiff who was one of “only a few private property 
owners subject to the . . . land use designation” at issue).  
 203 Wensmann Realty, 734 N.W.2d at 640 (holding that the plaintiff was dispropor-
tionately burdened by zoning because it was “not a situation where numerous prop-
erty owners are subject to the same kind of land use restrictions, and a single proper-
ty owner is asking the city to allow a new, different use”).  The Court’s reasoning 
implies that there would not have been a disproportionate burden if numerous own-
ers were bound by, and satisfied with, the regulatory status quo.  
 204 It could be argued that the same result occurs if unfair burdens on landowners 
are considered to be a part of Penn Central’s “economic impact” factor, but this is not 
the case.  Under my interpretation of Penn Central, the factory-builder might have a 
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there will often be no easy way to determine if a regulation evenly dis-
tributes burdens.
205
 
A second weakness of focusing on benefits and burdens is the 
difficulty of deciding whether a regulation both benefited and bur-
dened an individual takings plaintiff.  In particular, Echeverria argues 
that the “reciprocity of advantage cannot logically be confined to ex-
amining the countervailing benefits produced by the specific regula-
tion under challenge,”
206
 because a plaintiff may also benefit from 
other regulations.  For example, a landowner burdened by wetlands 
regulation may benefit from historic-preservation laws, or vice versa.
207
  
Thus, “considering all the countervailing benefits of different regula-
tory programs may make it virtually impossible to determine whether 
a regulated party is suffering a net loss from all of society’s regulated 
programs.”
208
 
So how does Echeverria resolve this problem?  By asking courts 
to consider the public interest favoring regulation—not directly, but 
as a means of determining the reciprocal benefit that regulation pro-
vides to a property owner.  He explains that 
[t]he magnitude of these reciprocal benefits will depend in sub-
stantial part on the public importance and value of the objective 
served by the regulations.  So long as a regulation applies broadly 
across the community, the value or importance of what the gov-
ernment is seeking to accomplish should weigh against the tak-
ings claim.
209
 
Thus, Echeverria asks judges to consider the benefits that a particular 
regulation provided a property owner but acknowledges that the only 
way to do so is by determining the strength of the public interest 
 
stronger case under the “economic impact” prong of Penn Central, but would have a 
much weaker case under the “character” factor due to the city’s strong interest in 
keeping factories away from residential neighborhoods.  Cf. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 
272 U.S. 365, 388–89 (1926) (noting the public interest in such exclusion).  But un-
der a reciprocity-based test, the factory builder might win under both prongs of Penn 
Central: she prevails under the “economic impact” prong because the value of her 
property was reduced by ninety percent, and she might prevail under the “character” 
prong because, as the neighborhood’s only would-be factory builder, she was singled 
out for regulation.  Given the Euclid Court’s apparent view that the public interest 
favors separating industry from housing, see id., this result makes little sense.   
 205 See Davidson, supra note 161, at 44–45 (“Equally challenging is finding a neu-
tral metric to evaluate an acceptable distribution of burdens.”). 
 206 Echeverria, supra note 171, at 205.  
 207 Id.  
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 207. 
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supporting the regulation—essentially adding an extra step to an al-
ready complex Takings Clause inquiry. 
The other element of Echeverria’s reciprocity-based test is 
whether a regulation is designed to confer benefits or prevent harm 
to the public.  Echeverria contends that this distinction is important 
because, “while it will sometimes make sense to require those who 
benefit from regulation to redistribute the gains to those burdened 
by the regulations, it will generally make less sense to require those 
protected from harm to pay those who have been restrained from 
harming others and the community.”
210
  Echeverria essentially makes 
a public-interest argument: “harm-preventing” regulations are sup-
ported by a stronger public interest than “benefit-conferring” ones. 
Few courts, however, are likely to adopt the “harm/benefit” dis-
tinction that Echeverria proposes.  As Echeverria concedes, the Su-
preme Court’s majority opinion in Lucas “disparaged the entire no-
tion that benefit-conferring regulations could be distinguished, ‘on 
an objective, value-free-basis,’ from harm-preventing regulations.”
211
  
Echeverria correctly notes that this language does not completely fo-
reclose his theory, because Lucas was not decided under the Penn Cen-
tral balancing test.
212
  Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Supreme 
Court would adopt a distinction in the Penn Central context that it 
criticized in Lucas.  
Ultimately, Echeverria’s two-factor test requires courts to focus 
on the weight of the public interest supporting regulation.  Thus, in 
most situations, his test will likely render the same results as the “pri-
vate harm/public interest” balancing test, and it has the added draw-
backs of being more complex and requiring the courts to go through 
some extra steps. 
V. HOW TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
For the reasons stated above, courts analyzing the “character” 
factor should consider the public interest supporting the alleged tak-
ing.  But this principle alone does not give courts much guidance.  
Given that the courts should weigh the public interest supporting a 
regulation, how precisely should they do it?  And should considera-
 
 210 Id. at 208.   
 211 Id. at 207.  
 212 Echeverria, supra note 171, at 177 (“[T]he statement was made in the context 
of a case involving regulation that rendered property valueless, and the decision 
cannot necessarily be read as repudiating the harm-benefit distinction outside that 
context, that is, in a Penn Central case.”). 
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tion of the public interest bar courts from using other criteria dis-
cussed above as part of the “character” analysis? 
A. How to Weigh the Public Interest 
The recent case of Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States
213
 pro-
vides a helpful illustration of how to properly weigh the nature of the 
public interest.  In Resource Investments, two landowners built a landfill 
on a site containing wetlands, but only after spending nearly a decade 
trying to obtain state and federal permits.
214
  The plaintiffs asserted 
that certain procedural steps imposed by the federal government 
constituted a compensable taking.
215
 
The Court of Federal Claims denied the parties’ cross-motions 
for summary judgment, holding that there was a genuine factual dis-
pute about whether the “character” factor weighed in favor of the 
plaintiffs or the government.
216
  The court began by noting that 
courts must “weigh the benefits, burdens, and distribution of a regu-
latory burden as part of this prong.  This requires an ‘inquir[y] into 
the degree of harm created by the claimant’s proposed activity, its so-
cial value and location, and the ease with which any harm stemming 
from it could be prevented.’”
217
 
Applying this test, the court found that the government’s regula-
tions advanced a “valid public interest”
218
 because they were designed 
to protect wetlands and nearby navigable waters from pollution.
219
  In 
particular, the government needed to regulate landfills because land-
 
 213 85 Fed. Cl. 447 (Fed. Cl. 2009).  
 214 Id. at 457–62 (describing the permit process in detail, noting in particular that 
the plaintiffs’ first permit application was in 1989 and that they were unable to begin 
construction of landfill until 1998).  
 215 Id. at 457.  The plaintiffs claimed that the “character” factor favored their tak-
ings claim because the federal government unreasonably required them to change 
their project’s statement of purpose from creating  “a municipal solid waste landfill” 
to “a viable, affordable, environmentally sound solid waste project” and that this “in-
voluntary revision converted their private enterprise into a de facto public project, 
thus forcing them alone to shoulder what should be the public burden of protecting 
a private good.”  Id. at 516. 
 216 Id. at 519.  
 217 Id. at 517–18 (quoting Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)).  
 218 Id. at 519.  
 219 Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 518 (stating that the regulation meant to “protect 
navigable waters by preserving wetlands hydrologically linked to those navigable wa-
ters”). 
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fills sometimes contaminate nearby groundwater.
220
  On the other 
hand, the court found that the risk of such contamination was “vani-
shingly small,”
221
 and the plaintiffs produced evidence “strongly sug-
gesting that the [government] treated them differently than other 
similarly-situated applicants.”
222
  These competing interests created a 
dispute of material fact sufficient to bar summary judgment.
223
 
The court’s “character” analysis in Resource Investments focused 
not only on the importance of the public purpose supporting the 
type of regulation at issue, but also on the effectiveness of the regula-
tion—that is, the extent to which the precise action taken by the gov-
ernment furthered the stated public purpose.  The court found that 
the general purpose of landfill regulation (preventing water pollu-
tion) favored the government’s permit delays,
224
 but also found that 
the low likelihood of actual pollution and the apparent arbitrariness 
of government decision making favored the plaintiffs’ claim.
225
  Thus, 
the government cannot avoid liability merely by showing that the 
public interest favored some sort of regulation; instead, it must show 
that the policies support both regulation in general and its specific 
conduct in the case at issue. 
B. What About Physical Invasions and Singled-Out Plaintiffs? 
The analysis above seeks to show that in takings actions, courts 
should focus their “character” analysis on whether the public interest 
supported the government regulation at issue.  But this conclusion 
leaves open the question of whether the courts should focus exclu-
sively on this factor or consider additional factors raised by lower 
courts in the past—most notably, whether the regulation is similar to 
a physical invasion, and the extent to which the plaintiff was “singled 
out” for regulation. 
The Lingle Court resolved the first issue when it stated that “‘the 
character of the government action’—for instance whether it 
amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property in-
terests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be re-
 
 220 Id. (noting “serious potential for public health problems should the landfill 
leach into the groundwater”). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 519. 
 223 Id.  
 224 Id. at 518–19.  
 225 Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 519.   
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levant in discerning whether a taking has occurred.”
226
  This language 
clearly indicates that the “character” factor requires courts to decide 
whether government conduct “amounts to a physical invasion.”
227
  If 
so, the government’s conduct is more likely to be a taking.
228
  If not, 
the plaintiff’s takings claim is more likely to fail. 
The second issue is more complex.  As noted above,
229
 it is diffi-
cult to know whether a regulation singles out a property owner or 
whether it distributes a burden fairly and evenly among property 
owners.  On the other hand, it is well settled that the Takings Clause 
is meant “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”
230
  Thus, the extent to which a property owner 
is “singled out” for an unfair burden cannot be completely irrelevant 
in Takings Clause jurisprudence. 
But this does not mean that the existence (or lack thereof) of an 
unfair burden needs to be a fourth element of a Penn Central-based 
balancing test, nor does it mean that the “character” factor will gen-
erally require analysis of such unfairness.  As explained above,
231
 a 
property owner who has been unfairly burdened by government reg-
ulation is likely to have suffered a large economic loss, while a prop-
erty owner who suffered a minimal economic loss is not as likely to 
have been singled out for excessive regulation.  So even if a property 
owner can credibly claim to have been singled out, to consider this 
fact under the “character” prong of Penn Central may lead to double-
counting, that is, considering the same fact—the property owner’s 
economic harm from being singled out for overregulation—under 
both the “character” prong and the “economic harm” prong. 
Admittedly, disproportionate economic burden is not the only 
way to determine whether a property owner has been “singled out” 
for unfair regulation.  For example, in Resource Investments, the plain-
tiffs claimed that the government “treated them differently than oth-
er similarly-situated applicants.”
232
  In theory, such unfair treatment 
could exist even if the government’s unfairness did not massively re-
 
 226 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id.  
 229 See supra Part IV.B.2.  
 230 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted).  
 231 See supra Part III.B.2.  
 232 Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 519 (Fed. Cl. 2009). 
LEWYN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2010  7:17 PM 
636 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:597 
 
duce the plaintiff’s property values.  But in that a situation, the court 
could follow Resource Investments and do what the Court of Federal 
Claims did: treat the defendant’s unfair burden as part of the “public 
interest” discussion, because a government action that is preposte-
rously overinclusive or underinclusive is obviously not going to be 
particularly effective in promoting the public interest. 
For example, suppose a real estate developer claims that the 
government allows development firms with brown-haired executives 
to fill in wetlands, but denies similar permits to firms with black-
haired executives.  Such an arbitrary regulatory scheme is unlikely to 
be an effective means of protecting wetlands. 
A regulation that singles out a small number of property owners 
for excessive regulation is likely to create great economic harm to 
those property owners, which supports finding liability under the 
“economic harm” prong of Penn Central.  Such a regulation may also 
be so inordinately underinclusive or overinclusive that it might not be 
truly effective in promoting the public interest, which supports find-
ing liability under the “character” prong of Penn Central.  Thus, a 
“public interest/private harm” balancing test does not preclude con-
sideration of whether a landowner has been unfairly burdened by 
regulation. 
In sum, courts’ “character” factor analysis should proceed as fol-
lows: 
(1) If a regulation amounts to a physical invasion, then the “cha-
racter” factor most likely supports a taking. 
(2) Otherwise, courts should focus on the public interest at 
stake—not just whether the government has a legitimate purpose for 
its conduct, but the extent to which the specific regulation effectively 
promotes that purpose.  The government will want to show that its ac-
tions created a high level of public benefit and/or prevented a signif-
icant public harm. By contrast, a takings plaintiff will want to show 
that the regulation produces minimal benefits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under Penn Central, courts must resolve regulatory takings ac-
tions by weighing the economic impact the regulation imposes on the 
claimant, the regulation’s interference with the claimant’s invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the character of the government ac-
tion.
233
  Before Lingle, many courts considered the weight of the gov-
 
 233 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
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ernment purpose supporting regulation and the regulation’s useful-
ness in achieving that purpose under the “character” prong of Penn 
Central. 
The Lingle Court stated that in evaluating the “character” factor, 
courts should focus on whether governmental action “amounts to a 
physical invasion” or “adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic 
life to promote the common good.”
234
  Thus, it appears that when 
government action involves a physical invasion, the “character” factor 
clearly favors a takings claimant.  But the Court’s reference to gov-
ernment regulation that “promote[s] the common good” suggests 
that courts should also continue to consider the extent to which the 
challenged program in fact supports the common good. 
Numerous post-Lingle courts and commentators assert that Lingle 
either eliminates the “character” factor or requires that it be reinter-
preted to focus on the extent to which government has unfairly bur-
dened a takings plaintiff.  But, given the language quoted above, 
there is no reason to believe that Lingle mandates such results.  Nor is 
there any reason to believe that these alternative frameworks would 
make Takings Clause litigation less confusing.  Accordingly, courts 
should continue to follow pre-Lingle precedent holding that the “cha-
racter” factor includes the public interest supporting the government 
action at issue. 
 
 
 234 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (citation omitted).   
